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The past few years have seen a growing awareness of – and concern about – the role of 
computer algorithms. Best-selling books such as Cathy O’Neill’s Weapons of Math 
Destruction (Crown Publishing Group, New York, 2016) have shed light on some of their 
more problematic uses and effects, in contexts ranging from finance to criminal justice to 
employment. Recently, attention has been drawn to their use in New Zealand, with examples 
in ACC, Immigration NZ and other contexts drawing concern and criticism from the media 
and academic commentators. (See, for example, Kirsty Johnston “Privacy and profiling fears 
over secret ACC software” NZ Herald (online ed, 15 September 2017); Lincoln Tan 
“Immigration NZ's data profiling 'illegal' critics say” NZ Herald (online ed, 5 April 2018)) 
Aside from these individual cases which have come to media attention, though, not much has 
been known about how – and how widely – algorithms are used in New Zealand. In October, 
Internal Affairs and StatsNZ took a first step in answering these questions, with the 
publication of their review of algorithm use across government agencies. The Algorithm 
Assessment Report (“the Report”)( https://www.data.govt.nz/use-data/analyse-
data/government-algorithm-tranparency) documented 32 algorithms being used for a variety 
of purposes across 14 agencies. The Report also considered the extent to which agencies have 
‘safeguards and assurance processes’ (at 4) in place around algorithm use. 
As a first step in forming an accurate picture of the extent and form of algorithm use across 
New Zealand government, the Report is timely and welcome. To what extent, though, are its 
findings likely to allay concerns about the use of algorithms by government? Are such 
concerns well-founded in any event, and if so, what sort of measures could be taken to 
address them? Funded by the New Zealand Law Foundation, our multi-disciplinary team at 
Otago University has been looking at these sorts of issues from a range of perspectives. In 
this article, we explore these questions and considers some implications for practitioners and 
policy-makers. 
 
What is an algorithm? 
The Report defines a computer algorithm as ‘a procedure or formula for solving a problem or 
carrying out a task.’ (at 5) It notes that the term can be taken to apply to very simple 
computerised processes, some of which have been in use for decades. (The Report uses the 
term “business rules” to refer to simple algorithms that “make determinations about 
individuals or groups without a significant element of discretion” – at 7.) The Report’s focus, 
however, is primarily on more complex processes, which “can now model complex 
outcomes” and “use statistical methods and predict likely outcomes” (at 5.)  
The Report is primarily concerned with what it calls Operational Algorithms; those that 
“result in, or materially inform, decisions that impact significantly on individuals or groups” 
(at 7.) It notes that algorithms are also used “for policy development and research”, but treats 
those cases as out of scope, on the basis that “they have no direct or significant impact on 
individuals or groups” (at 7.)   
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Though we can see why they were not the main focus of this particular review, we would not 
want to give the impression that that latter cohort are immune from ethical or other concerns. 
While it may well be true that these have no direct impact at the level of individual decisions, 
it is less clear that algorithms which inform important policy decisions have no significant 
impacts at group levels. Certainly, some of our discussions with data scientists have 
suggested that data use for these purposes is worthy of closer consideration, for example, 
where algorithms are used to guide operational decisions on how to address social inequities 
where those inequities arise from previous policy decisions. 
 
Risks and benefits 
The Report notes several advantages to algorithm use, ranging from (at 4):  
the immediate, such as reducing costs to the taxpayer and speeding up the delivery of 
services, to the indirect, such as increasing New Zealand’s productivity and improving 
the lives of people by reducing social harm.  
Speed and efficiency are not the only advantages that have been claimed for algorithms. The 
possibility also exists that they could in many cases produce more accurate decisions and 
predictions, informed by quantities of data vastly greater than a human decision-maker could 
make use of. As the AI Forum recently noted in their own report (AI Forum NZ Artificial 
Intelligence: Shaping a Future New Zealand (May 2018) at 26): 
We live in a data rich world and human brains are not equipped to analyse today’s 
vast quantities of structured and unstructured data, make connections, identify 
relationships and patterns across datasets. 
But disadvantages and dangers have also been well documented, particularly those related to 
accuracy, transparency, bias and control.  
Concerns about accuracy can arise where the algorithm is assumed to work without that 
assumption being thoroughly tested. A recent report from the AI Now Institute referred to a 
troubling example used in the Washington DC juvenile criminal system (AI Now Institute 
Litigating Algorithms: Challenging Government use of Algorithmic Decision Systems. 
(September 2018) at 14): 
… the system in the DC case had been in use in the juvenile criminal system since 2004, 
but had not been challenged until 2018. … When [defence attorneys] dug into the validity 
behind the system, they found only two studies of its efficacy, neither of which made the 
case for the system’s validity; one was 20 years old and the other was an unreviewed, 
unpublished Master’s thesis. The long-held assumption that the system had been 
rigorously validated turned out to be untrue, even though many lives were shaped due to 
its unproven determination of ‘risk’. 
Regarding transparency, the concern is that an algorithm whose workings are not open to 
scrutiny is less open to being peer reviewed, its outputs less likely to challenged, and 
decisions made based upon them will be more difficult to appeal. Difficult need not mean 
impossible, and a considerable amount can be discerned about the accuracy of certain 
algorithms with sufficient information about inputs and outputs; seeing ‘the working’ isn’t 
always necessary to check if the sums add up. However, as we discuss below, this form of 
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scrutiny involves resources and expertise unlikely to available to most people affected by 
such decisions. 
Perhaps the worst case scenario is where an algorithm operates as a ‘black box’ (a term 
popularised by Frank Pasquale, in The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That 
Control Money and Information (Harvard University Press, 2015)), its reasoning opaque even 
to those who designed or who rely on it. This would not have been a risk with previous 
generations of algorithms – the “very simple computerised processes” with which the Report 
is not concerned. But more advanced techniques such as machine learning are allowing for 
the development of “algorithms whose actions are difficult for humans to predict or whose 
decision-making logic is difficult to explain after the fact.” (Brent Mittelstadt, Patrick Allo, 
Mariarosaria Taddeo, Sandra Wachter, Luciano Floridi “The ethics of algorithms: Mapping 
the debate” (2016) 3(2) Big Data and Society 1 at 3.) 
With regard to bias, the House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence described 
the problem like this (House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. AI in the 
UK: ready, willing and able? (April 2018, at 107): 
These systems are designed to spot patterns, and if the data is unrepresentative, or the 
patterns reflect historical patterns of prejudice, then the decisions which they make 
may be unrepresentative or discriminatory as well.  
The sort of concerns that have been expressed about discretion are well captured in this quote 
from Cathy O’Neill (at 10):  
… you cannot appeal to a WMD [Weapon of Math Destruction]. That’s part of their 
fearsome power. They do not listen. Nor do they bend. They’re deaf not only to charm, 
threats, and cajoling but also to logic – even when there is good reason to question the 
data that feeds their conclusions.  
Whether that is a bug or a feature of algorithms will depend on a range of considerations. 
Discretion, after all, is the same mechanism that allows for nepotism and cronyism. Both 
O’Neill’s and other recent books, though, point to examples of algorithmic intransigence that 
seem like legitimate causes for concern when important decisions are wholly automated or 
ineffectively supervised. 
How well are New Zealand government agencies addressing these risks? The Report paints a 
mixed picture. With regard to transparency, it notes that, while “[t]hree-quarters of 
participating agencies provide descriptions of their operational algorithms on their websites” 
(at 28), what these contain “vary significantly”. While some provided “plain English 
descriptions of the rationale and use of algorithms including examples”, others had “largely 
technical documents that may be difficult for anyone who is not familiar with data processing 
to understand” (at 28).   
With regard to bias, the stocktake found “little consistency across government” in terms of 
“reviewing and assessing outcomes ... to ensure there are no unfair, biased or discriminatory 
outcomes” (at 29.) And regarding fears about algorithmic intransigence, it offers some 
reassurance that “[h]umans, rather than computers, review and decide on almost all 
significant decisions made by government agencies” (at 4). 
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The Report recommends improvements to current practice. To improve transparency, it 
recommends a two-tier approach, including both “simple summaries” and (at 34): 
more detailed information about how data is collected and stored, the computer code 
used in the algorithms, and what role the algorithm plays in the decision-making 
process for those who are interested in more technical material.  
 
The Report makes a number of other recommendations, including: 
 that more attention should be paid to including stakeholder perspectives, and 
especially those of Maori people, during the development of algorithms; 
 that consideration should be given to “establishing a centre of excellence to provide 
support and advice on best practice processes across government” (at 35); and 
 that something along the lines of regulatory impact and privacy assessments could be 
employed by agencies wishing to employ algorithms, focusing on principles for safe 
and effective data use and legal obligations (at 33). (We discuss these principles 
later.) 
We strongly support all of those recommendations. With regard to another of its 
recommendations, however, we are somewhat more cautious. Throughout the report, 
emphasis is placed on the importance in ‘keeping a human in the loop’, i.e. ensuring that “a 
real person has exercised human judgement during the process and over the final decision” 
(at 31.) While we recognise that this could be valuable for some reasons and in some 
contexts, as we explain below, we are somewhat wary of possible false reassurance in this 
regard. 
It is interesting to observe that none of the Report’s recommendations relate to creating new 
legal protections, safeguards or rights, nor to strengthening those that already exist. In fact, 
the Report barely refers to law at all; it is concerned with operational, procedural and 
practical matters. For our purposes, though, we are very interested in legal issues to which the 
use of operational algorithms in government may give rise. (This is not at all to suggest that 
use of algorithms outside of government raises no legal questions, merely to confine the 
scope of the present article to the scope of the stocktake.) 
In the next section, we  consider some legal implications of algorithm use, including for 
decisions made or significantly informed by them, before considering some possible reforms. 
 
Legal implications of algorithm use 
At present, New Zealand has no primary legislation specifically dealing with algorithmic 
decision-making, nor any secondary legislation (such as codes, rules or regulations). This in 
itself need not be a cause for concern. Many new technologies have developed in New 
Zealand without the need for root and branch legal reform. Instead, for the most part, 
regulation of new technologies has occurred on an “as needed” basis, with specific laws in 
some areas (such as telecommunications and assisted reproductive technologies) and none in 
others (for example, despite its ubiquity, the statute book contains no definition of “the 
Internet”). Before we leap to the conclusion that new algorithm-specific rules or regulations 
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are required, it makes sense to take stock of the adequacy of existing law for responding to 
the challenges presented by more advanced algorithms.   
Operational algorithms that affect entitlements, such as some of those in the Report, may be 
subject to appeal or review depending on the regulatory context within which they are made. 
For example, decisions made under the Accident Compensation Act will be liable to the same 
processes for challenge and dispute resolution as those made by a human agent. Decisions 
relating to benefit entitlement or other forms of social security assistance may be subject to 
the Social Security Appeals process and automated tax assessments may be reviewed under 
the Inland Review or Tax Administration Acts. 
Decisions that are made or assisted by algorithms may be subject to judicial review. Grounds 
may include, for example irrationality (taking into account irrelevant factors or failure to take 
into account relevant ones), bias or predetermination (for example, where the algorithmically 
generated decision has been accepted without clear evidence of human oversight) or whether 
the use of AI appears to have unduly fettered the decision-maker’s discretion. Conversely, 
grounds for review may arise if a client is given a favourable predictive assessment which an 
official does not agree with and does not follow. 
The capacity to challenge, appeal or review a decision relies significantly on being able to 
access information about how that decision was arrived at. In the absence of a specific 
statutory regime for review, the Official Information Act 1982 is likely to be relevant. Section 
23 (1) provides that anyone who has been subject to a decision or recommendation by a 
department or Minister of the Crown is entitled to (inter alia) the reasons for that decision or 
recommendation. (See also analogous provision under s 22 of the Local Government Official 
Information and Meetings Act 1987.) 
This raises the question of what, in the context of an algorithmic decision, would qualify as a 
‘reason.’ In Re Vixen Digital Limited [2003] NZAR 418, the High Court has held that (at 
[43]): 
Where the legislature has specified that reasons must be given I should think those 
reasons must be sufficient to enable any body with a power of review to understand 
the process of thought whereby a conclusion was reached. Equally the reasons must 
allow those with vested interests, like those of the appellant, to so understand the basis 
for decisions as to be better informed in predicting that which is or is not within the 
law. Further, in this case the public has a general interest in knowing and 
comprehending the standards that the Board sees as important. 
In the context of algorithmic decisions, providing an explanation that is intelligible to 
affected persons and the general public could prove especially problematic. As Dr Janet 
Bastiman explained in her evidence to UK Parliament Science and Technology Ctte (2017): 
The resulting systems can be explained mathematically, however the inputs for such 
systems are abstracted from the raw data to an extent where the numbers are 
practically meaningless to any outside observer. 
What sorts of “reasons” can we expect from an intelligent machine? Deep learning involves 




An explanation meaningless to the person who requested it is unlikely to satisfy the 
requirements of the Official Information Act. Considerable attention is being paid to the 
challenge of rendering algorithmic systems transparent or explainable, and a number of 
suggested solutions have been canvassed. We briefly discuss some of these in the final 
section.  
Agencies relying on algorithms to make or inform decisions must also be alert to their 
obligations around discrimination. The Human Rights Act 1993, for example, prohibits 
discrimination on a variety of grounds when offering services to the public, including in the 
areas of access to public goods and services, employment, housing, education and transport.  
The definition of discrimination includes both direct and indirect discrimination: an act or 
omission may be considered discriminatory whether the intention or effect of the act or 
omission results in disadvantage or other harm. (Human Rights Act 1993 and see Human 
Rights Commission Privacy, Data and Technology: Human Rights Challenges in the Digital 
Age (Issues Paper 2018)) 
Care should be taken by agencies using algorithms to assist decision-making to ensure that 
human rights violations do not arise unintentionally and unexpectedly from their use. This 
may involve more than simply excluding certain protected characteristics from the data. 
While it would be easy enough to programme an algorithm that does not include data about 
race or gender, difficulties arise from the fact that other data may become a proxy for race or 
social status (such as an address or postcode), meaning that “unwanted discrimination can 
sneak back in” (Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale “Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘right to 
an explanation’ is probably not the remedy you are looking for” (2017) 16(1) Duke Law & 
Technology Review 18, at 29.) 
Particular difficulties may arise where characteristics such as race, sex or age statistically 
correlate with outcome variables that are relevant factors to take into account in a particular 
decision, for example, likelihood of victimisation, of having learning difficulties, of being 
convicted of property theft or failing to achieve seniority in certain jobs (at 29). Such 
correlations may be statistically accurate, but may not be the desired outcome from a decision 
on access to an entitlement to a service. In these circumstances, the use of results without 
context or deeper critique may result in discrimination. 
Another approach may be to specifically include these characteristics and undertake a human 
rights analysis of the results to better assess possible direct or indirect discrimination. The 
best approach is not yet clear and this is an area where more work is needed. 
Where a decision on service entitlement is supported by an algorithm which has used the 
personal information of a specific individual, the Privacy Act will also apply. In these cases, 
the service provider must ensure that the information used has been collected lawfully and for 
a clear purpose (Privacy Act 1993, Privacy Principles 1-4). Before using it, they must be 
satisfied that the information is accurate, up to date and not misleading (Privacy Principle 8) 
and is being used for a purpose for which it is collected, unless a lawful exception applies 
(Privacy Princples 10). In these cases the customer will be entitled to ask for access to their 
personal information and, if they consider the personal information relied on is not correct, to 
seek correction (Privacy Principles 6 and 7). More specific personal information privacy 
codes may apply if the service relates to credit reporting or telecommunications. (See Credit 
Information Privacy Code 2004 and Telecommunications Information Privacy Code 2003). 
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Regulatory approach – are changes needed? 
In 2018 the House of Lords concluded that “Blanket AI-specific regulation, at this stage, 
would be inappropriate”.1 In New Zealand, regulators are taking a cautious approach, with 
each appearing to consider the specific issues within their various statutory mandates. For 
example, in 2018, the Government Chief Data Steward and the Privacy Commissioner issued 
six principles for effective data use (Government Chief Data Steward and Privacy 
Commissioner “Principles for safe and effective use of data and analytics” (2018)). The 
principles are intended to assist agencies “in data analytic activities, including algorithmic 
decision-making”.  
Other initatives are also being developed, for example, the Ministry of Social Development 
has developed a Privacy, Human Rights and Ethics (PHRaE) Framework 
(https://www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd-and-our-work/work-
programmes/initiatives/phrae/index.html). This approach, along with that of the Financial 
Markets Authority, demonstrates that agencies in New Zealand are taking a pragmatic but 
principled approach. However, regulators do need to stay in touch with developments, 
particularly those overseas. 
 
Algorithmic Transparency 
The Council of Europe Data Protection Convention  108 and the General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”) contain specific provisions for algorithmic transparency. For example, 
article 13 of the GDPR imposes transparency obligations for automated decision-making, 
including when used for profiling. Convention 108 also provides for the right to request and 
obtain the reasoning underlying data processing. The UK House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee recently noted that the right to an explanation is a key part of 
achieving accountability for government and recommended openness by default in certain 
circumstances, namely, explanations of decisions should be published when algorithms affect 
the rights or liberties of individuals.  Several submissions on the Privacy Bill in New Zealand 
have also recommended new requirements for algorithmic transparency.  
The Report does not address the question of whether specific legal provision should be made 
for algorithmic transparency, but it does recommend that agencies give consideration to 
making available detailed information about the algorithms they use, including the computer 
code on which they operate. (p.34) Publishing technical details of the algorithm is potentially 
valuable; the potential for peer review by the wider community of experts is appealing from 
the perspective of ensuring accuracy. But it will not contribute much to the objective of 
providing a clear explanation of why a decision was made, and a basis for deciding whether it 
should be appealed or challenged. As the Report notes, clear explanations that are accessible 
to lay readers is also important. 
Right to erase personal information 
Article 17 of the GDPR introduces a new right to erasure of personal information. Calls for 
this new right emerged in response to the concerns about weakening of the protections of 
                                                          
1 Above n 9, paras 16 and 386. 
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obligations to delete information, protections that were designed to ensure that personal 
information is not kept any longer than is necessary. The use of personal information for 
algorithms and artificial intelligence technologies inevitably creates tension with these 
obligations as agencies will want to keep data for as long as possible. Article 17, which 
embodies the new right to erasure, enables individuals to assert the right to have data 
removed. However, it is unclear how the right to erasure and the closely related right of data 
portability would apply in the context of agencies using personal information for algorithmic 
service development or where an individual has an on-going relationship with the agency. 
Right of review 
The Courts Matters Bill contains what appears to be the first New Zealand statute based 
automated electronic decision-making system, including a right of review. New sections 
86DA to 86DD, provide for the Chief Executive to authorise an automated electronic 
decision-making system for setting fine payment arrangements, including a greater time for 
payment or payment by instalments. Where such a system is approved, the Chief Excutive 
must, pursuant to section 86A(4), also approve procedures for operating the system which 
must also include procedures for: 
(a) setting the criteria for variations; 
(b) identifying the information that will be sought from the individual; 
(c) notifying the individual or their representative of the right to seek variation of the 
arrangement; and 
(d) notifying of the right to review by a person of any automated decision.  
New section 86DC provides that the Chief Executive may only approve an automated system 
if satisfied that “each system has the capacity to do any actions required with reasonable 
reliability” (emphasis added) and “there is a process available under which a person affected 
by an action performed by an electronic system can have that action reviewed by a person 
authorised by the chief executive to review those actions, without undue delay.” 
The Bill provides a useful model for automated decision-making, but its specificity does raise 
questions about the absence of such a provision in other legislative contexts where decisions 
are already being made. While the Report notes that the algorithms are only being used in 
cases where there are benefits, we note that any complaints about those decisions may give 
rise to questions about the legal basis for their use. 
A ‘human in the loop’ 
One message that emerges fairly strongly from the Algorithm Report is about the reassurance 
offered by retaining human oversight or decisional autonomy, at least over important 
decisions.  While for example the new ACC system for approving claims will automatically 
approve all simple claims, “complex or sensitive claims will be reviewed by an ACC staff 
member” (at 5). Perhaps more importantly, only approvals will be automated; any claims that 
are declined must be processed by a human operator. 
The Report’s position on this is one likely to resonate with many people (at 31): 
… where algorithms are material to decisions which affect people’s lives in significant 
ways, it is reasonable to expect that a real person has exercised human judgement 
during the process and over the final decision.  
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This position also resonates with article 22 of the GDPR, which provides that a person: 
… shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated 
processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or 
similarly significantly affects him or her. 
A degree of scepticism has, however, been expressed regarding to the extent that such a 
requirement offers genuine reassurance, at least in some situations. For some sorts of 
decisions, it may simply be that a well-designed algorithm would make more accurate 
decisions than any human, and inserting a human back into the system risks diluting that 
accuracy.   
In other situations, there may be value in human oversight. Some sorts of ‘errors’, it has been 
suggested, may be difficult to predict or explain in a manner comprehensible to an algorithm, 
and may be more easily detected by humans – those which involve initiative in the face of 
unforeseen outcomes, perhaps, or an understanding of social and cultural factors. 
Even where there is value in having human oversight, though, questions have arisen about 
how well humans will be able to discharge such a role. Human factors research has suggested 
that a range of  attentional and attitudinal obstacles may stand in the way of effective human 
supervision of machine systems. As the accuracy of such systems increases, human ability to 
detect occasional errors deteriorates;  “the operator assumes that the system is reliable and 
therefore failure detection deteriorates” (Kayvan Pazouki, Neil Forbes, Rosemary A Norman 
and Michael D Woodward  “Investigation on the impact of human-automation interaction in 
maritime operations” (2018) 153 Ocean Engineering  297 at 299). 
This is likely to be particularly pronounced in contexts such as driverless cars that require an 
inert but alert human supervisor behind the wheel. But in less urgent contexts too, more 
attention will need to be given to the question of how to ensure that any ‘human in the loop’ 
offers more than token reassurance. 
 
The limitations of rights-based models 
Rights to reasons, to privacy and to be free from discrimination undoubtedly have value in 
this context, and part of the challenge will be to ensure that they can be meaningfully applied 
in the context of algorithmic decision-making. Doubts have, however, been expressed as to 
the general adequacy of rights-based models for promoting accountability in algorithm use. 
Some of these concerns relate to the capacity of ordinary people to assess algorithms for the 
sorts of factors we have identified, e.g. accuracy and bias. As Edwards and Veale put it, 
“[i]ndividuals are mostly too time-poor, resource-poor, and lacking in the necessary expertise 
to meaningfully make use of these individual rights” (“Slave to the Algorithm”, at 67). 
Virginia Eubanks have pointed out that in many cases we will be oblivious to the fact that we 
are subject to algorithmic decisions: “Many don’t know that they are being targeted or don’t 
have the energy or expertise to push back when they are” (Virginia Eubanks Automating 
Inequality (St Martin’s Press, 2017) at 6). 
One of our main concerns is that, even when individual rights work as intended, they are 
ultimately individual rights. Even if they grant us access to meaningful information about 
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how decisions were made in our own cases, they will not reveal a ‘wide angle’ view 
necessary to evaluate whether these systems are exacerbating unfairness and inequality 
between sections of the population. 
Such limitations have led an increasing number of commentators to look to supplement 
‘bottom up’ rights-based models with some form of ‘top-down’ oversight agency, with the 
capacity to scrutinise the use of such algorithms in a broader and more specialised manner. 
The devil, of course, lies in the detail, and the form that such an agency should take – as well 
as details as to its remit and regulatory powers – are the subject of ongoing discussion. It 
seems, though, that broad agreement or consensus is coalescing around the perceived utility 
of some such agency.  
 
Conclusion  
There is a danger, when lawyers write about new technologies, to overstate the risks they 
present, and by implication, to overstate the merits of the status quo. We should be clear, 
then, that our aim here is neither to exaggerate the dangers of algorithmic decision tools, nor 
to adopt too rose-tinted a view of their human counterparts. In an increasingly data-saturated 
environment, it is entirely possible that algorithms will often out-perform humans in a range 
of tasks, including some of those covered in the most recent Report. We also entirely accept 
that  human decision-makers far from perfect. As we have noted elsewhere (John Zerilli, 
Alistair Knott, James Maclaurin and Colin Gavaghan “Transparency in Algorithmic and 
Human Decision-Making: Is There a Double Standard?” Philosophy & Technology 
(published first online 5 September 2018)): 
It is true that human agents are able to furnish reasons for their decisions, but this is 
not the same as illuminating the cognitive processes leading to a conclusion. The 
cognitive processes underlying human choices, especially in areas in which a crucial 
element of intuition, personal impression, and unarticulated hunches are driving much 
of the deliberation, are in fact far from transparent. 
Our aim in this paper – and in our project more generally – is to identify ways in which the 
benefits of algorithms can be optimised, and their risks and disadvantages minimised.  
Towards this end, the Report is timely and a welcome first step in forming an accurate picture 
of the extent and form of algorithm use across New Zealand government. While the Report’s 
findings are likely to allay some concerns about the use of algorithms by government, other 
concerns remain well-founded. We welcome the Report’s recommendations for measures to 
address these concerns. However, more work is needed to  provide legal clarity and to 
consider whether new rights, remedies or regulators  are needed. The AI and Law Project will 
continue to explore these issues and publish research findings. 
